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NOTE
CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT v. GARRET F.:
THE COURT RULED.
CONGRESS, NOW IT'S YOUR TURN
Ronald S. Horn*
INTRODUCTION
Disability is a natural part of the human experience and
in no way diminishes the right of individuals to partici-
pate in or contribute to society. Improving educational
results for children with disabilities is an essential ele-
ment of our national policy of ensuring equality of op-
portunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabili-
ties.I
For decades, this country failed to provide adequate education for
children with disabilities.2 Historically, both physically and mentally
disabled students were excluded from the public school system. An
J.D. Candidate 2000, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic Univer-
sity of America; B.S. 1991, United States Coast Guard Academy. The author
would like to thank his family, the editors of THE JOURNAL OF
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POLICY and Brian F. Binney and Michael
D. Russell for their invaluable assistance.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1)(West Supp. 1998).
2. See Christine Moyles Kovan, Disability Law-Susquenita School Dis-
trict v. Raelee S., Pendent Placement and Financial Responsibility Under the
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act: The Third Circuit's Extension of
Burlington, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1867, 1867 (1997).
3. See LaDonna L. Boeckman, Bestowing the Key to Public Education:
The Effects of Judicial Determinations of the Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act on Disabled and Nondisabled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 855,
855 (1998).
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example of this harsh treatment is evidenced by the 1919 Wisconsin
Supreme Court case State Ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Education of An-
tigo.
4
In Beattie, a child suffered from paralysis of his limbs, excitability,
uncontrollable salivation, and paralysis of his vocal cords, 5 the latter
creating a "raspy" quality to his voice. The action was brought, by
Beattie's father, in municipal court where a judgment was rendered in
favor of Beattie attending public school. The school board argued
"that his physical condition and ailment produce[d] a depressing and
nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children."7 On appeal,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that "[t]he right of a child of
school age to attend the public schools of this state cannot be insisted
upon, when its presence therein is harmful to the best interests of the
school."8
As state courts wrestled with the issue of educational equality for
disabled children, Congress began to take legislative steps toward a
solution.9 Yet, even though Congress enacted the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education' Act of 196510 and the Education of the Handicapped
Act of 1970,11 millions of disabled children continued to lose the bat-
tle for equality in public education. Just prior to the enactment of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), Con-
gress found that of the "more than eight million children with dis-
abilities in the United States," more than half were not receiving ap-
4. 172 N.W. 153, 155 (Wis. 1919).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 154.
7. Id. at 153. Essentially, the only reasons articulated by the school
board and court as to why the child's presence was "harmful" were:
[the child] has not the normal use and control of his voice,
hands, feet, and body, ... [being] slow and hesitating in speech,
and [has] a peculiar high, rasping and disturbing tone of voice ac-
companied with uncontrollable facial contortions, making it diffi-
cult for him to make himself understood. He also has an uncon-
trollable flow of saliva, which drools from his mouth upon his
clothing and books, causing him to present an unclean appearance.
Id. at 154.
8. Id.
9. See Boeckman, supra note 3, at 859-62.
10. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
11. Pub. L. No. 91-230, §601-62, 84 Stat. 175 (1970)(codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. §1400-1491 (1994)).
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propriate educational services. 2 It further found that approximately
one million "children with disabilities in the United States were en-
tirely excluded from the public school system."' 3 In addition, due to
the absence of adequate services for children with disabilities in public
education, thousands of families were forced "to find services outside
the public school system, often at great distance from their residence
and at their own expense."'
' 4
The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act of 1991 (IDEA)
represents a decades-long culmination of legislative and judicial effort
to ensure children with disabilities the right to a "free appropriate
public education." 15 The IDEA reorganized the structure and system
of providing appropriate educational opportunities to children with
disabilities. 16 Until recently, the scope of services required to be pro-
vided to disabled children under the IDEA, a statute which has existed
under different names for the last three decades, 7 remained undefined.
Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. 18 is the latest
in a line of cases concerning the right of children with disabilities to
receive a "free appropriate public education."' 9 At the age of four,
Garret F. (Garret) suffered a spinal cord injury leaving him a quadri-
plegic and ventilator-dependent. 20 As a result of these injuries, Garret
requires a personal attendant at all times in order to attend school.2'
The issue in Cedar Rapids is not new to the courts. The controversy
centers on an interpretation of the "medical services" exclusion in the
"related services" provision of the IDEA. Specifically, the Court at-
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1)(1994).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(4)(1994).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(6)(1994). Extensive statistics regarding disabled
children are listed in the Congressional finding section of the Act.
15. Haekyoung Suh, Note, The Need for Consistency in Interpreting the
Related Services Provision Under the Individuals With Disabilities Education
Act, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1321, 1324 (1996).
16. See H.R. Rep. 102-198 at 7, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 310, 316.
17. See Michael Dannenberg, A Derivative Right to Education: How Stan-
dards-Based Education Redefines the Individuals With Disabilities Education
Act, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 629, 631 (1997).
18. 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999).
19. For an excellent overview of prior cases involving the Individuals
With Disabilities Education Act and the approach of the various federal courts,
see Suh, supra note 15, at 1329 (citing 343 F. Supp. at 302).
20. See Cedar Rapids, 119 S. Ct. at 995.
21. See id.
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tempted to resolve whether the support services that Garret requires to
attend school qualify as "related services" and should, therefore, be
provided by the school district.2 2 Under the IDEA, services that qual-
ify as "related services" are the responsibility of the school district. 3
However, "related services" falling within the "medical services" ex-
clusion of the IDEA exempt the school from covering them.24 Where
the "medical services" exclusion applies, the burden of the costs asso-
ciated with the excluded services falls on the family of the disabled
child. While the Court has established tests to examine what consti-
tutes a "related service, 25 and what is excluded under the IDEA, con-
tinuing litigation demonstrates the issue is not a settled one. 6
This Note will focus on Cedar Rapids Community School District v.
Garret F. and analyze the "medical services" exclusion in the "related
services" provision of the IDEA. Section I examines the procedural
history of Cedar Rapids and follows its path from the Iowa Depart-
ment of Education Administrative Law Judge ruling to the Supreme
Court. Section II will examine the IDEA and its legislative develop-
ment from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(ESEA). This discussion scrutinizes the cases that prompted federal
statutory changes aimed toward improving the education of children
with disabilities. Section III focuses on the interpretation of the
"medical services" exclusion of the IDEA and the Court's prior han-
dling of the issues presented in Cedar Rapids. Further, Section III ex-
plores some economic concerns associated with providing services
under the IDEA and the relevance of the severity of a disability.
I. CEDAR RAPIDS V. GARRET F.
A. Challenging the School District
Cedar Rapids is the tragic story of Garret, who was severely injured
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See 20 U.S.C. §1401(a)(17) (1994).
25. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
26. There is a great deal of inconsistency among all the federal circuit
courts on deciding what exactly a school is required to provide. For a concise
discussion of the case law involving the "related services" provision of the
IDEA, see generally Suh, supra note 15.
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at the age of four during a 1987 motorcycle accident. 27 Garret remains
a quadriplegic with serious and continuous medical needs. 28 The par-
ties include the Petitioner, Cedar Rapids Community School District
and the Respondent, Garret F., a minor represented by his mother,
Charlene. 29 The most specific and critical aspects of this case are Gar-
ret's physical condition and required support services.
Garret requires urinary bladder catheterization about
once a day, suctioning of his tracheostomy as needed,
food and drink on a regular schedule, repositioning,
ambu bag administration if the ventilator malfunctions,
ventilator setting checks, observation for respiratory
distress or autonomic hyperreflexia, blood pressure
monitoring, and bowel disimpaction in cases of auto-
nomic hyperreflexia.3 °
Garret's parents and the Cedar Rapids Community School District
entered into an agreement for the time period of kindergarten through
fourth grade, whereby Garret's parents would provide a personal at-
tendant to care for him during the school day.3' These services were
funded through an insurance policy and money received from a 1.3
million-dollar settlement with the motorcycle company. 32 When Garret
started the fifth grade in 1993, the agreement between Garret's parents
and the school district expired at which time the school district stated
that it was not required to provide the one-on-one nursing services.33
Garret administratively challenged the school district at an Iowa
State Administrative Hearing in December 1994. 34 The Iowa Admin-
istrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of Garret, holding Garret's
continuous nursing services are "related services" under the IDEA and
27. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822,
823 (8th Cir. 1997).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 823-24.
30. Id. Autonomic hyperreflexia is defined as "[a] condition commonly
seen in patients with injury to the upper spinal cord." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 168 (16th ed. 1989). This involves acute hypertension,
sweating, severe headache, etc. See id.
31. See Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 823.
32. See Court Considers School's Role in Caring for Disabled (visited
November 4, 1998) <http://www.cnn.com>.
33. See Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 824.
34. See Brief for Petitioner at I, Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v.
Garret F., 106 F.3d 822 (1997).
1999]
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required the school district to provide them." The ALJ held that fed-
eral regulations 36 make a distinction between those services provided
by a school nurse and those provided by licensed physicians." The
ALJ, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision. in Irving Inde-
pendent School District v. Tatro,38 ordered the Cedar Rapids Commu-
nity School District to reimburse Garret's family for costs incurred
during the 1993-94 school year, including continuous nursing
services.39
The school district appealed the Iowa Administrative Law Judge's
decision to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Iowa. 40 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.41 The Dis-
trict Court granted Garret's motion for summary judgment holding
that the services required by Garret did not fall within the "medical
services" exclusion of the IDEA and were required to be provided by
the school district. 42 The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Cir-
cuit, affirmed the District Court's decision.43 The Court of Appeals
stated that its decision was controlled by the test established by the
Supreme Court in Tatro.4
The Court of Appeals applied the Tatro "physician-based test' ' 5 to
determine whether Garret's continuous nursing services were "sup-
portive" in nature.46 Finding that they were, the court next determined
35. See Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 824.
36. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16(a), (b)(4), b(1 1) (1998).
37. See Cedar Rapids, 119 S. Ct. at 996.
38. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 883.
39. See Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 824. The high costs of Garret's serv-
ices have been tremendous. During the seven-hour school day Garret's family
"paid $418.50 per hour for the 1993-1994 school year and $22.00 per hour for
1994-1995 for the nursing services at school." Brief for Respondent, Cedar
Rapids, 106 F.3d at 824. These high costs resulted in exhaustion of two medi-
cal insurance policies and personal funds. See id.
40. Both Garret and the Cedar Rapids Community School District filed
motions for summary judgment. In an unpublished decision, the District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa granted summary judgment in favor of Gar-
ret. See Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 824.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 825.
44. See id. at 824.
45. Suh, supra note 15, at 1326.
46. By "supportive," the court must decide whether the services are nec-
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whether the continuous nursing services could be excluded "as medi-
cal services beyond diagnosis and evaluation. 47 The Court of Appeals
reasoned that since the services required by Garret were provided by a
nurse and not a physician, they did not constitute medical services
"other than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes" and were thereby
not subject to the "medical services" exclusion of the IDEA.48
The Court of Appeals, however, acknowledged the existence of
several contrary decisions, showing that Tatro did not establish a
bright-line test.4 9 Several courts have held that full-time nursing serv-
ices are per se enough to bring the services within the scope of the
medical services exception of the IDEA. 50 The Court of Appeals dis-
missed these cases as "beyond the physician/nonphysician distinction
the Supreme Court found in the statute and the regulations." 51
B. The Supreme Court's Decision: Tatro Revisited
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, looked to the statutory
definition of the "related services" provision of the IDEA, the Court's
prior decision in Tatro, "and the overall statutory scheme" in affirm-
ing the decision of the Court of Appeals.5 2 Justice Stevens further ac-
knowledged that Cedar Rapids was not the first time the Court re-
viewed the scope of the "medical services" exclusion." The Court's
holding in Tatro that "the Secretary of Education had reasonably de-
termined that the term 'medical services' referred only to services that




49. See id. The court cited to Detsel v. Board of Educ., 637 F. Supp.1022
(N.D.N.Y. 1986), aft'd, 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
981, 108 S. Ct. 495, 98 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1987); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon
M., 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992); Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68
F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995). In addition, the Cedar Rapids Court alluded that it
did not necessarily agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute
and regulations. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals felt "bound by the Su-
preme Court's holding." Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 825.
50. See Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Where Will the Supreme Court Draw the
Line Between Medical and School Health Services Under the IDEA? 128 ED.
LAW. REP. 559, Oct. 1998, available in 128 WELR 559.
51. Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 825.
52. Cedar Rapids, 119 S. Ct. at 1000.
53. See id. at 997.
1999]
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must be performed by a physician, and not to school health service
5 4
was clear and directly applicable in Cedar Rapids as well."
The Cedar Rapids Community School District, however, did not ask
the Court to expand the definition of "medical services" so far as to
exclude those services Garret requires. 56 In other words, the District
did "not argue that any of the items of care that Garret needs, consid-
ered individually, could be excluded from the scope of §
1401(a)(17). ' '57 What the school district did ask the Court to consider
was the overall character and extensive nature of the care Garret re-
quired. 58 To remedy the impact of such a case as Garret's, the District
proposed a test in which a series of factors would be considered, in-
cluding: (1) the continuous nature of the care; (2) ability of school
health personnel with respect to each service; (3) cost; and (4) conse-
quences resulting from improper performance of the services.
59
The Court rejected the Cedar Rapids School District argument for a
"balancing" or "multi-factor" test.60 While recognizing the financial
burden continuous services can impose, the Court held that higher cost
does not mean services can be considered "more 'medical." '' 6' Such a
balancing test lacks any legal support, statutory or regulatory.62
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA: CONGRESS AND THE
COURTS
The Supreme Court noted in the now famous Brown v. Board of
Education63 decision, that "[e]ducation is perhaps the most important
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See id. "As the ALJ concluded, most of the requested services are
already provided by the District to other students." Id.
57. Cedar Rapids, 119 S. Ct. at 998.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id at 1000. The multi-factor test proposed by the District focused
on the character of the care provided to disabled students. Specifically, the Dis-
trict sought consideration of "'[1] whether the care is continuous or intermittent,
[2] whether existing school health personnel can provide the service, [3] the cost
of the service, and [4] the potential consequences if the service is not properly
performed' Id. (citing Brief for the Petitioner at 11).
61. See id. at 998.
62. See Cedar Rapids, 119 S. Ct. at 998.
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Garret F.: Congress, Now It's Your Turn
function of state and local govemments." 64 While Brown did not ad-
dress the issue of equality in education for children with disabilities, it
certainly set the stage.65 Yet, for decades equal opportunity in educa-
tion continued to elude children with disabilities.
66
A. Legislative Attempts to Improve Education for Disabled
Children
In 1965, Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act (ESEA) 67 as an attempt to improve education for low income
children and children with special needs. 68 However, Congress later
determined that "the existing programs [including the ESEA] were in-
effective and lacked a strong central administrative body., 69 As with
many first attempts at progressively legislating new areas, it soon be-
came clear to Congress that more was needed to improve education for
children with disabilities. 70 Subsequent amendments to the ESEA cor-
rected the deficiency by creating a grant program for states.7'
In 1968, this nation saw a thirty-eight percent increase in the total
number of programs for educating children with disabilities. 72 Fortu-
nately for millions of children with disabilities in the United States,
73
guaranteeing a "free appropriate public education" began to receive
64. Id. at 493.
65. See Boeckman, supra note 3, at 859 (discussing judicial support for
the educational system).
66. One need only look at the Congressional findings made prior to en-
actment of the Education for All Handicapped Act of 1975 to discover the sur-
prising statistics concerning how many disabled children in this country were
not receiving appropriate educational services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
67. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), amended by Pub. L. No. 89-750,
80 Stat. 1204 (1966).
68. See Suh, supra note 15, at 1327.
69. Id. at 1321 (quoting S. Rep. No. 168, at 5 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1429).
70. See Kovan, supra note 2, at 1868. One goal, which is not new to the
latest legislative efforts at ensuring equality in education for disabled children,
is the guarantee of a "free appropriate public education." Id. However, the is-
sue of financial responsibility for the education of disabled children persists.
Id.
71. See Suh, supra note 15, at 1328.
72. See Boeckman, supra note 3, at 861.
73. See id. Specifically, the civil rights movement, .among many other
things, sought equal educational opportunities for minorities. See id.
1999]
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greater legislative attention74 due in part to continued victories in the
civil rights movement. These victories furthered the goal of equal
educational opportunities for disabled children as well as others. 75 In
1970, the ESEA was replaced with the Education of the Handicapped
Act (EHA) 76 which combined all federal education programs designed
for disabled children into one statute. 7 The EHA expanded the scope
of special programs and increased federal financial assistance to the
states. 78 Among the EHA's chief improvements was the creation of
"special programs for the deaf-blind, regional resource centers, special
preschool programs, and a National Media Center for the Handi-
capped.'79 More significantly, the EHA enhanced educational guar-
antees by requiring an "Individualized Education Program" (IEP) de-
signed to meet the specific needs of each child with a disability. 0 The
IEP was a critical step toward ensuring a specialized system capable
of addressing educational needs of children with disabilities and
thereby improving their overall educational benefits.
B. Judicial Involvement
1. Landmark Cases: PARC and Mills
Although Congress took early legislative steps8' to ameliorate the
74. See id.
75. Specifically, the civil rights movement, among many other things,
sought equal educational opportunities for minorities. See id. at 861. How-
ever, the impact of the civil rights movement on education for disabled chil-
dren is best characterized as setting a "precedent" for equality in educational
opportunity, not to characterize all aspects of the civil rights movement as
identical to the struggles faced by disabled children. See id.
76. See Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-62, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994)).
77. See id.
78. See Kovan, supra note 2, at 1877; See also Suh, supra note 15, at
1328.
79. S. Rep. No. 634, at 90 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2832.
80. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(20) (Supp. 1999). The IEP must include: (a)
present educational performance, (b) instructional goals and objectives, (c)
specific educational services provided, (d) transition services, (e) date and du-
ration of services, and (f) evaluation procedures. See id.
81. The earlier acts included the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 and the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970.
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neglect and exclusion of children with disabilities, the landmark cases
of Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania
(PARC)8 2 and Mills v. Board of Education8 3 were the first cases to en-
ergize Congress to become "an active participant in education
policy.
' '84
In PARC, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children and
the parents of thirteen developmentally disabled children brought a
class action suit on behalf of all developmentally disabled children
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 5 The plaintiffs sued in
federal court alleging that Pennsylvania's compulsory education stat-
utes86 violated the children's right to due process and denied the chil-
dren the right to an education. 87
The District Court questioned the rational basis for the complete
exclusion of developmentally disabled children and concluded "that
the plaintiffs [had] established a colorable claim under the Due Proc-
ess Clause" and on equal protection grounds.88 The Court approved a
Consent Agreement between the plaintiffs and defendant in PARC,
stating that it was "the Commonwealth's obligation to place each
mentally retarded child in a free, public program of education and
training appropriate to the child's capacity .... ,89 The Court deemed
that while separation into a special class was permissible, total exclu-
sion was not. 90
Within three months of the PARC decision, the United States Dis-
82. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
83. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
84. Suh, supra note 15, at 1329. See also PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 279;
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 866; Kovan, supra note 2, at 1873; Boeckman, supra
note 3, at 862.
85. See PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281-82.
86. For a concise description of the relevant statutes enacted under Penn-
sylvania law see generally Boeckman, supra note 3.
87. See PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 283, 297. The plaintiffs argued that the
Pennsylvania statutes violated the due process clause because the statutes
contained no "provision for notice and a hearing before a retarded person is
either excluded from a public education or a change is made in his educational
assignment within the public system." Id. at 283. Additionally, the plaintiffs
argued that there existed no rational basis for the statutory presumption re-
tarded children are uneducable and untrainable. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 307.
90. See id. at 297.
1999]
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trict Court in the District of Columbia was presented with a similar
case. 91 In Mills, an action was brought on behalf of seven children
who were denied access to the District of Columbia public schools be-
cause of behavioral, mental, and emotional problems. 92 As in PARC,
the court found that the school district's failure to provide any educa-
tional services violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process
Clause and Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.93
The court also examined the school district's financial concerns re-
garding the provision of expensive educational services 94 and con-
cluded these concerns do not limit the requirement to provide the
services. The court required the school district "to provide a publicly-
supported education for these 'exceptional' children."
95
By the summer of 1975, twenty-eight states filed forty-six lawsuits
to determine the rights of students with disabilities with respect to
educational opportunities.96 The decisions in PARC, Mills, and others
soon caught the attention of lawmakers. 97 Congress realized that fur-
ther legislative steps were necessary to achieve educational equality
for disabled children.
2. Legislative Improvements
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act (EAHCA) 98 to end what Congress deemed "the failure of
state education systems to meet the educational needs of children with
disabilities."99 The stated purpose. of the EAHCA was "to ensure that
all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education that emphasizes special education and related serv-
ices designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for em-
91. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 866.
92. See id. at 868.
93. See id. at 875; see also Suh, supra note 15, at 1329.
94. The defendants claimed that relief for the plaintiffs in this case would
not be possible unless Congress appropriated millions in additional funding to
support services for the children or the Board of Education diverted millions of
its own appropriated funds. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875.
95. Id. at 876.
96. See Boeckman, supra note 3, at 863.
97. See id.
98. See 20.U.S.C. § 1401 (1994).
99. BONNIE POITRAs TUCKER, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW § 14.1 (West
1994).
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ployment and independent living."' 00
C. Current Law: The Individuals With Disabilities Education
Act
In 1991, the EAHCA was amended and became known as the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).'0 ' The IDEA's pri-
mary purpose is identical to the EAHCA: to ensure that all children
with disabilities have access to a "free appropriate public
education.', 10 2 The IDEA represents the culmination of a half-century
of litigation and federal legislative effort to assist disabled children
with disabilities in the education arena. In order for a state to qualify
for federal financial assistance under the IDEA,'0 3 the state must dem-
onstrate a policy guaranteeing disabled children access to a "free ap-
propriate public education"' 4 and be submitted for approval to the
Secretary of Education.
10 5
There has been little agreement in the courts concerning exactly
what a school district must provide. 10 6 Specifically, courts have strug-
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (Supp. 1994).
101. H.R. Rep. No. 102-198, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
310.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994). The IDEA has existed, albeit under dif-
ferent names, for the last three decades. The Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965, the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970 and the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act all emphasized special education
and sought the common goal of a "free appropriate public education" for all
disabled children. See Dannenberg, supra note 17, at 631.
103. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. 1999).
104. Id.
105. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (Supp. 1998). The IDEA defines the term
"free appropriate public education" as:
special education and related services that have been provided at
public expense, under public supervision and direction, and with-
out charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program
Id. required....
106. See generally McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C.
1983) (holding that the student's hospitalization care did not fall within the
related services provision of the IDEA); Timothy W. v. Rochester Sch. Dist,
875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989) (holding that
the requested services fell within the statutory definition of related services);
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gled to decipher what "related services"' 7 schools must provide to
disabled students in order to guarantee a "free appropriate public edu-
cation" under the IDEA.' °8
D. Judicial Interpretation of the Statutory Language
The Supreme Court first examined the extent of "free appropriate
public education" requirements in Board of Education v. Rowley. 109
Amy Rowley, a deaf student, requested a sign-language interpreter
from the school district in addition to the hearing aid already
provided." 0 The school district consulted the district's Committee on
the Handicapped prior to denying her request."' An action was
brought alleging that the refusal to provide a sign-language interpreter
denied Amy the right to a "free appropriate public education" as guar-
anteed by the EAHCA. 112 The Supreme Court found that the
EAHCA's "requirement of a 'free appropriate public education' is
satisfied when the state provides personalized instruction with suffi-
Detsel v. Board of Educ., 820 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 981 (1987) (focusing on the "extent and nature" of the services
required, the court ruled that the school district was not required to provide
nursing services); analyzed in Suh, supra note 15.
107. The IDEA defines "related services" as:
Transportation, and such developmental, corrective and other
supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology,
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recrea-
tion, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, coun-
seling services, including rehabilitation counseling and medical
services except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic
and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child
with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes
the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in
children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994).
108. See Suh, supra note 15, at 1323.
109. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). While the Rowley Court addressed the require-
ment of "free appropriate public education" under the EAHCA, it is important
to note that the requirement is a central feature of the IDEA as well. See Bo-
eckman, supra note 3, at 865.
110. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. Amy's IEP provided that she would be
in a regular classroom, use a hearing aid, receive tutoring for the deaf for one
hour each day, and speech therapy three hours per week. See id. at 184.
111. Seeid. at 185.
112. See id. at 177. An interpreter was in fact placed in Amy's kindergar-
ten class for two weeks and the interpreter reported that such services were not
required. See id. at 184.
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cient support services to permit the handicapped child to benefit edu-
cationally from that instruction."'"13 The Court developed a two-part
inquiry to examine the adequacy of an educational program for chil-
dren with disabilities.
14
In the first step, the Court inquires as to whether the state meets the
procedures established in the EAHCA." Secondly, the Court deter-
mines whether "the individualized educational program developed
through the Act's procedures [is] reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits."'"16 The Court further held in
Rowley that if these two prongs are satisfied, "the State has complied
with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require
no more." 117 Thus, while a school district has an obligation under the
Act to provide some services to disabled children not provided to
other children, it does not have the obligation to provide every possi-
ble related service.'
18
E. The "Medical Services" Exclusion: Irving Independent
School District v. Tatro
Irving Independent School District v. Tatro provided the Supreme
Court with another opportunity to refine and expand the interpretation
of the statutory language of the EAHCA. 19 The primary question con-
sidered by the Court in Tatro was whether the "related services" pro-
vision required the school district to provide the service of clean in-
termittent catheterization (CIC).
120
Amber, the Respondent's daughter, was an eight-year-old girl born
with spina bifida.12 1 Due to her condition, Amber suffered "from or-
thopedic and speech impairments and a neurogenic bladder, which
113. Id.
114. See Suh, supra note 15, at 1324.
115. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Suh, supra note 15, at 1325.
119. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 883.
120. Clean Intermittent Catheterization is the "[i]ntroduction of a catheter
through the urethra into the bladder for withdrawal of urine." TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 306 (16th ed. 1989). The procedure is de-
scribed as "simple" and able to be "performed in a few minutes by a layperson
with less than an hour's training." Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885.
121. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885.
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prevent[ed] her from emptying her bladder voluntarily.' ' 122 The school
district, in consultation with Amber's parents, developed an IEP as re-
quired under the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) that was in
force at the time. 123 However, the program did not make provisions for
the administration of CIC to Amber. 124 After reviewing the statutory
definitions of "related services" and "free appropriate public educa-
tion," the Court developed the Tatro "physician-based test."'
1 25
To determine if "a service is a related service," the first inquiry
centers around "whether the service is a 'supportive service[ ] .. .re-
quired to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special educa-
tion.' ,,1 26 Essentially, a court asks whether the absence of a specific
service would prevent a child from attending school and thus deny him
or her the benefits of a special education.' 27 If a court holds in the af-
firmative, it must then consider whether the provided support service
"is excluded from [the] definition [of a related service] as a 'medical
servic[e]' serving purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation."'
128
Hence, if the support service is deemed a "medical service," it falls
within the exception and the school district will not be required to
provide such service.
The Tatro Court relied on the IDEA's statutory definition of "medi-
cal service"' 29 and concluded that since CIC did not require the serv-
ices of a physician and was necessary to assist the child "to benefit
from special education," it constituted a "related service." As such,
the CIC remained the responsibility of the school district to provide.
30
In reaching this conclusion, the Tatro Court also considered the
regulations of the Department of Education.13' Specifically, the Court
122. Id.
123. See id. at 885-86.
124. See id. at 886.
125. Suh, supra note 15, at 1325.
126. Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 824 (citing Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890).
127. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890.
128. Id.
129. Medical service is defined as "services provided by a licensed physi-
cian to determine a child's medically related disability that results in the
child's need for special education and related services." 34 C.F.R. §
300.16(b)(4) (1999); see also Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890; Suh, supra note 15, at
1325.
130. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 887-88.
131. See id. at 891-92. The definition of "related services" is now codified
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considered the definition of "school health services" as defined by the
Department of Education as "services provided by a qualified school
nurse or other qualified person."' 32 Further, "medical services" was
defined under the regulations as "services provided by a licensed phy-
sician." 33 Accordingly, the Court held the Secretary's interpretation of
the statute as reasonable and consistent with Congressional intent.
34
In light of the Supreme Court's 'interpretation of what constitutes a
"related service," and what is excludable as a "medical service," Tatro
proved to be the key case for the court in Cedar Rapids Community
School District v. Garret F.
III. CEDAR RAPIDS: AFFIRMING PRECEDENT OR JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE?
A. The Standard Set by Tatro
A proper analysis of any statute necessitates a reading of its lan-
guage. At the center of Cedar Rapids was the term "medical." In
Tatro, the Irving Independent School District offered a common sense
definition of "medical services" by arguing that a service may consti-
tute a "medical service" despite the fact that it is "provided by a nurse
or trained layperson."'' 35 This interpretation of "medical service" was
based on Texas law,' 36 and under the law, CIC was restricted to physi-
cian prescription and supervision.137 The Court, however, noted that
the school district nurses in Tatro were "authorized to dispense oral
medications and administer emergency injections in accordance with a
physician's prescription.' 38 The Court stated, "[iut would be strange
indeed if Congress, in attempting to extend special services to handi-
capped children, were unwilling to guarantee them services of a kind
that are routinely provided to the nonhandicapped."'139 Thus, a school
under 34 C.F.R. § 300.24 (1999).
132. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892.
133. Id. The "medical services" definition is now codified under 34 C.F.R.
300.24(b)(4) (1999).
134. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892.
135. Id. at 883.
136. See id. at 893.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 893-94.
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district cannot claim the "medical services" exclusion under the IDEA
for services that are routinely provided to nonhandicapped individuals.
As a result, the Supreme Court found the school district's argument
"unconvincing," "anomalous," and conflicting with Congress'
intent.140 However, questions regarding the meaning of the "medical
services" exclusion remained when the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Cedar Rapids.
1. A Search for the Plain Meaning or Dictionary Games?
TABER'S CYCOLPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY defines "medical" as
pertaining "to medicine or the study of the art and science of caring
for those who are ill."' 4 ' This definition suggests that one who cares
for the ill is providing a "medical" service. This basic definition sup-
ports a broader interpretation of the "medical services" exclusion to
include services provided by a school nurse.
42
To support a broader interpretation, the Cedar Rapids Community
School District argued that the "IDEA is an education law" and that
the plain language of the IDEA requires that "all medical services, not
just those directly provided by a physician, . .. be excluded from the
school district's responsibility."143 Further, the school district urged
that the intensive nature of the services required by Garret mandated a
"common sense" definition of "medical services." It argued the Court
should look to a "series of factors" to determine whether health care
services are the sole responsibility of the school district. 44 The major-
ity in Cedar Rapids, however, was very clear in its refusal to overturn
prior case law or engage i9 the act of rewriting regulations.1
45
140. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 893.
141. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 306 (16th ed. 1989).
142. Congress provides contrary definitions for the term "medical" in other
statutes. For example, the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 of the United
States Code Section 213(d)(1) states "'medical care' means amounts paid (A)
for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body." 26 U.S.C. §
213(d)(1)(A) (1988). The Cedar Rapids School District also looked to Title
XIX of the Social Security Act which defined the term "medical assistance" to
include services other than those provided for by a physician. See also Peti-
tioner's Brief at 11.
143. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 822.
144. See id. at 10-11.
145. See Cedar Rapids, 119 S. Ct. at 998.
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2. Action by Congress and the Secretary of Education: The Status
Quo
The Court's holding in Cedar Rapids is a logical result in light of
the standard of statutory construction setout in Chevron v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council.146 Under Chevron, a review of an agency's
interpretation of a statute necessitates two parts: (1) if congressional
intent is clear in the statute, the Court and the agency must give defer-
ence to this intent, and (2) if Congressional intent is ambiguous or
non-existent, then the Court must look to the administrative interpre-
tation and decide if "the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." 147 If the agency's interpretation is reason-
able, a court will defer to the agency.
48
Since the IDEA is relatively silent with respect to the "medical
services" exclusion, the Court looked to the Secretary of Education's
determination that "medical services" meant those services performed
only by a physician. 49 While holding that the Secretary's construction
is permissible, the Court noted the uncertainty with which the De-
partment of Education viewed the IDEA. 50 It recognized the Secre-
tary's authority to adopt regulations defining "medical services" and
the fact that the Secretary had not recently chosen to do so.' In Cedar
Rapids, the Court also pointed out that the Secretary of Education
supported affirming the Court of Appeals' decision in a Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae.
5 2
3. An Early Attempt to Define "Medical Services"
Given that the Court showed deference to the Secretary of Educa-
tion's authority to adopt regulations defining "medical services," it is
only reasonable to look at the subsequent history of the IDEA. Before
146. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See Cedar Rapids, 119 S. Ct. at 998. Support for the "physician-
nonphysician" test can be found in 34 C.F.R. § 300.24 which defines "medical
services" as "services provided by a licensed physician to determine a child's
medically related disability that results in the child's need for special educa-
tion and related services." Id.
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Tatro was decided, the Department of Education issued proposed
regulations addressing the definition of "medical services." ' There
existed a recognized need to reduce the financial and administrative
burden of the regulations.
15 4
The proposed regulations sought to alter the "medical services" ex-
clusion to include "services relating to the practice of medicine."'
55
Further, the proposed regulations provided for a guideline to allow
public agencies to seek determinations from state medical licensing
authorities on whether a service is considered a "medical service."
156
Later, on November 3, 1982, the Secretary withdrew these proposed
regulations in light of public comment. In 1983, section 1407(b) was
added to the IDEA to prohibit the Secretary from lessening the proce-
dural or substantive protections provided to disabled children under
the Act. Perhaps, as pointed out by the Respondent in Cedar Rapids,
this reflects "congressional confirmation that the current 'related
services' regulation reasonably interprets congressional intent."'
5 7
B. Examining the Severity of the Disability as a Factor in
Considering the Extent of the Medical Services Exclusion
Despite the strong precedent set by the Supreme Court's decision in
Tatro, lower courts continued to draw a line when the services re-
153. See Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47
Fed. Reg. 33836 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed Aug. 4,
1982).
154. The Summary of Proposed Rulemaking stated:
The Secretary proposes to amend the regulations for the Assis-
tance to States for Education of Handicapped Children program.
The Secretary believes that changes proposed in this document
will result in regulatory requirements which adhere more closely
to the language of the statute and its legislative history. The pro-
posed regulations are designed: (1) To reduce fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens on recipients while implementing statutory protec-
tions that ensure the availability of a free appropriate public edu-
cation to all handicapped children, and (2)to address various
problems that have arisen in the implementation of the program
since the current regulations became effective in October 1977.
The proposed amendments will also make the regulations clearer
and easier to understand.
Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47 Fed.




157. Brief for Respondent at 23, Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 822.
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quired became "extraordinary medical needs and their costs [became]
too burdensome."'' 8 These lower court decisions advocated the need
for a balancing test to determine when required services cross the line
into "medical services." As the Court first noted in Rowley and re-
stated in Tatro, "Congress sought primarily to make [meaningful]
public education available to handicapped children.' 59 This is a theme
that has remained constant throughout all litigation involving the right
of disabled children to a "free appropriate public education."
Cedar Rapids was not the first opportunity a court has had to con-
sider the severity of a student's disability.' 60 In 1986, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York considered a case
with facts similar to those in Cedar Rapids. Detsel v. Board of Educa-
tion of the Auburn Enlarged City School District 161 involved Melissa,
a seven-year-old girl, who required constant respirator assistance.
162
In Detsel, the school district refused to provide her with continuous
nursing services arguing, as the Cedar Rapids Community School
District did, that whether or not "a supportive service is a medical
service is a matter of degree. ' 163 The services required for Melissa in
Detsel closely resembled medical services because Melissa's vital
signs required monitoring, she needed to be provided medication, and
she required a procedure to clear her lungs of fluid.' 64 Thus, the school
district in Detsel, as in Cedar Rapids, argued for what amounted to a
balancing test.' 65 The district court in Detsel, although considering the
Supreme Court's opinion in Tatro, l' s agreed with the school district
and held that the EAHCA did not require the school district to "pro-
158. Suh, supra note 15, at 1326.
159. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891.
160. See Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1022, 1023. Additionally, one common
theme throughout all cases cited in this Note is the fact that the respective
school districts resisted the requirement to provide support services based on
the individual's specific disability.
161. 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
162. See id. at 1023.
163. Id. at 1025.
164. See id. Melissa's vital signs required monitoring, administration of
medication through a tube, and "a procedure known as 'P, D and C' which
calls for the ingestion of saline solution by the child into her lungs; the nurse
subsequently strikes her about the lungs for four minutes and then suctions out
any mucus collected in her lungs." Id. at 1024.
165. See Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1022; Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 822.
166. See Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1022.
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vide a severely disabled child with constant, in-school nursing
care."
167
The reasoning of the district court in Detsel was clear: requiring a
school district to provide such extensive services would be too great a
burden and contrary to the Supreme Court's finding in Tatro.
168
Namely, that "the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that [the
statute] was designed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a
service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range
of their competence.' 69
Not all courts, however, placed .great emphasis on the burden
school districts face for providing support services to severely dis-
abled children. Such an emphasis would be key only for those desiring
a balancing approach. For example, in Timothy v. Rochester School
District,70 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined a case
involving a child with multiple disabilities and profound retardation,
171
a situation which appeared to be far worse than Melissa's situation in
Detsel.172 The court held that "[t]he statutory language, of the Act, its
legislative history, and the case law construing it, mandate that all
handicapped children, regardless of the severity of their handicap, are
entitled to a public education."'
173
C. Economic Factors and the IDEA
Arguably, a main policy consideration against a narrow definition
of the "medical services" exclusion is an economic one. The costs in-
curred by a school district providing support services to any child with
a disability is often proportionately related to the severity of the dis-
ability. 74 The more extensive the disability, the more extensive the re-
167. Id. at 1027.
168. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 883.
169. Id. at 892.
170. 875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989).
171. Timothy W. was born two months prematurely with severe respiratory
problems, and shortly thereafter experienced an intracranial hemorrhage, sub-
dural effusions, seizures, hydrocephalus, and meningitis. As a result, Timothy
is multiply handicapped and profoundly mentally retarded. He suffers from
complex developmental disabilities, spastic quadriplegia, cerebral palsy, sei-
zure disorder and cortical blindness. See id. at 955-56.
172. See Detsel, 820 F.2d at 587.
173. Timothy, 875 F.2d at 972-73.
174. See Osborne, supra note 50, at 559.
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quired services and related costs will likely be.
As currently interpreted by the Court in Cedar Rapids, the "medical
services" exclusion is held to mean only those services provided by a
licensed physician. While issues such as nature of the service and re-
quired specialized training of the attendant certainly affect the costs
and subsequent degree of burden on a given school district, they are
not factors to be considered. 7 5 Thus, while the door to education is
open to any disabled child capable of receiving support services from
anyone other than a licensed physician, such an interpretation could
prove costly to many school districts and to the education system as a
whole. Funding required to assist disabled children is continually the
cornerstone of debate and allocation by some school districts may
come at the expense of non-disabled children.
76
The statutory language of the IDEA, requires "related services" to
be provided to a disabled student free of charge at public expense. 77
Early on, funding was not a significant factor for the schools. 7 8 How-
ever, due to the increasing requirements under the related services
provision of the IDEA, and the increasing number of students in need
of special education, school systems are beginning to feel the eco-
nomic strain. 179 The National Center for Education Statistics estimates
expenditures for public education to be $6,407 per student during the
1998-99 school year. 80 A child with a disability, depending on the se-
verity/extent of required services, could easily exceed this amount.
Yet, while cost can prove to be a real burden for some school
districts, 18 states do receive federal funds under the IDEA,'8 2 so long
as a "State shall demonstrate to the Secretary that ... [t]he State has in
175. See id.
176. See Dannenberg, supra note 17, at 632.
177. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(18)(A) (West 1998).
178. See Boeckman, supra note 3, at 869.
179. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a)(17) (1994); see also Boeckman, supra note 3
at 869-70.
180. See National Center for Education Statistics, Public Elementary and
Secondary Education Statistics, School Year 1998-99, Department of Educa-
tion (Apr. 1999).
181. For a sampling of cases which provide an overview of the economic
struggles some schools face, see Boeckman, supra note 3, at 869-70. See also
PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 301 (stating that the economic "burden of implement-
ing this settlement falls primarily upon the Commonwealth, not the local dis-
tricts or intermediate units").
182. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1) (West 1998).
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effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free
appropriate public education.' ' 3 In addition, the IDEA provides for
"grants to local educational agencies or intermediate educational units
to pay part or all of the cost of altering existing buildings and equip-
ment. ' " The flaw in the economic argument in favor of a broader
definition of medical services is the language of the IDEA itself,
which states that:
State and local educational agencies have a responsi-
bility to provide education for all handicapped children,
but present financial resources are inadequate to meet
the special educational needs of handicapped children;
and it is in the national interest that the Federal Gov-
ernment assist State and local efforts to provide pro-
grams to meet the educational needs of handicapped
children in order to assure equal protection of the
law. 185
In addition, the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA included a funding
formula provision 1 6 "to ensure that each state receives no less than the
amount received in the prior year."'1 7 Given the fact that Congress has
and will continue to take into account funding concerns of states and
school districts, it is reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court
has apparently left the resolution of economic issues for state and fed-
eral legislatures. Whether or not federal and/or state funds are enough
to sustain a given school district is dependent upon factors such as the
number of disabled children, the severity of the disabilities, and the fi-
nancial strength of the school district in question.
IV. CONCLUSION
Absent further action by Congress, the meaning of the "medical
services" exclusion has been conclusively interpreted to mean only
those services provided by a licensed physician. While the economic
burden of this decision may rear its head in the future, there is little
doubt that the establishment of a bright-line rule in Cedar Rapids will
183. Id.
184. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a) (West 1998).
185. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b)(8-9) (West 1998).
186. See Dixie Snow Huefner, The Individuals With Disabilities Education
Act Amendments of 1997, 122 ED. LAW. REP., Mar. 1998, available in 122
WELR 1103.
187. Id.
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improve the opportunity for all disabled children to receive a "free ap-
propriate public education."' 88 Finally, the Court's ruling in Cedar
Rapids will facilitate consistency in the courts concerning interpreta-
tion of the "medical services" exclusion. As previously recognized by
scholars examining this issue, those who remain unsatisfied with the
Court's decision in Cedar Rapids should now concentrate their efforts
on Congress.
188. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 822.
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